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In the past decades, shareholder democracy has been the center of attention in corporate
governance research. Academic commentators have lined up on both sides of the debate
and have fiercely advocated either increasing or limiting shareholder power. Yet, the scope
of many of these arguments has so far been unclear, so that they could in fact always be used
again for even more, or even less, shareholder democracy, until the board or the shareholder
meeting is entirely depleted of authority. This article explores the dividing line between
shareholder say and board autonomy in public companies and puts forward a normative
criterion that can be consistently applied to the various subject matters of corporate deci-
sion-making. A criterion based on “inherent” conflicts of interest of directors, I argue, is
economically efficient and meets the underlying rationale of existing corporate law systems
in Europe and the United States. Specifically, shareholder power should comprise, but also be
limited to, matters in which directors face an inherent conflict of interest. The problems of
shareholder passivity, short-termism and empty voting and the concern about stakeholder
interests do not call for a further reduction of shareholder power beyond this limitation.
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I. Introduction
The distribution of corporate power between the shareholder meeting and the
board of directors is both highly topical and as old as the corporation itself.
Since the origins of the stock corporation, lawmakers have been preoccupied
with striking the right balance. Judging from the heated discussions on share-
holder democracy today, both in legal scholarship and at the legislative level,
the matter still has not reached equilibrium. As if that were not enough, the
division of powers between boards and shareholder meetings is gaining im-
portance on the European continent, as stock ownership patterns slowly seem
to become more dispersed, in which case fewer boards will be dominated by
controlling shareholders.
The current state of affairs is the result of a historical evolution in which
legislators were concerned about economic efficiency but did not, until re-
cently, dispose of adequate economic frameworks. In the absence of such
frameworks, lawmakers sought inspiration in the prevalent conception of
the corporation, theories of legal personality and analogies to a parliamentary
democracy. This led to less than optimal choices, which repeatedly had to be
corrected later on. Modern problems, such as empty voting and agency con-
flicts within institutional investors, have further complicated the issue and, as
will be seen, have sometimes unnecessarily diverted attention away from the
essential function of shareholder democracy.
Today, solid economic frameworks are available that allow the development of
a consistent normative criterion for an efficient allocation of powers. Building
on the concepts of both agency costs and transaction costs, this article advan-
ces a criterion based on conflicts of interest that are inherent to the position of
directors (sometimes combinedwith amateriality requirement). Inherent con-
flicts of interest are different from those tackled by rules on related party
transactions and conflict of interest procedures, in that they do not depend
on concrete circumstances, but can be expected to arise systematically. Never-
theless, the conflicts of interest procedure and rules on related party trans-
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actions exhibit the same underlying rationale as the proposed criterion and, as
such, support its validity.
This article is organized as follows. Part I identifies the factors that have
shaped the allocation of corporate powers throughout history and those that
play a role in the current academic debate. It exposes the need for a consistent
normative criterion, which is developed in Part II. Based on a comparison of
the board of directors and the shareholder meeting with regard to both agency
costs and transaction costs, Part II proposes, delineates and briefly applies the
criterion of inherent conflicts of interest. Part III analyzes and demonstrates
the weakness of many of the arguments commonly invoked against share-
holder power, at least in legal systems that apply the proposed criterion.
For the ease of exposition, Parts I and II will assume that the corporate interest
equals long-term shareholder value. This assumption will be relaxed in Part
III, Section 4, which investigates if concerns about stakeholder interests affect
the proposed criterion. It should also be noted that the scope of this article is
restricted to the internal distribution of decision-making authority, as pro-
vided by the law, for public companies that are not part of a group. No con-
sideration will be given to the questions of howmuch the parties can deviate in
the articles of association, how the proposed criterion must be adapted in
order to function in private companies, or whether specific group law is desir-
able. Neither does the article enter into the division of powers between direc-
tors and managers (who will be considered as acting together) or the choice
between the many forms and shades of decision-making authority (such as
prior authorization, ex post ratification etc.).
II. Lack of a consistent normative criterion
The distribution of powers between directors and shareholders has almost
constantly been in motion, with legislators alternately strengthening the
shareholder meeting and the board of directors. The first Section of this first
Part shows how these developments concurred with developments in the
conception of the corporation and in the theory of legal personality1 and
how they have also been inspired by the analogy between corporate deci-
sion-making and political decision-making in a parliamentary democracy,
and, in the end, finds this historical basis wanting. The second Section outlines
the rich academic debate on the subject and highlights the need for a clear
1 About the distinction between theories of legal personality and theories of the corpo-
ration, see Nicholas H.D. Foster, Company Law Theory in Comparative Perspective:
England and France, 48 Am. J. Comp. L. 573, 580 (2000).
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criterion for the allocation of powers between the board and the shareholder
meeting.
1. Historical and intellectual basis of the existing power allocation
At the inception of the stock corporation, in the form of the chartered East
India Companies of the early seventeenth century, shareholder power was
severely limited because corporations were considered a state affair.2 This
would gradually change over the eighteenth century. In the nineteenth cen-
tury, the stock corporation emerged in the new corporate laws of several
European jurisdictions.3 By then, the shareholder meeting was considered
the supreme corporate body with absolute power.4 Much of this was through
practice more so than black letter law. Both the French Commercial Code of
1807 and the Prussian Stock Corporations Act of 1843 were silent as to the
organization of corporate decision-making.5 The French Commercial Code
did not even mention the shareholder meeting and confined itself to stipu-
lating that directors were to be appointed temporarily and were removable
from office.6 By virtue of civil law principles, however, a director’s mandate
for governing a company, no matter how broad the mandate was formulated
in the articles of association, excluded the ability to dispose of corporate
property.7 In addition, the government frequently steered towards an expan-
sion of the competences of the shareholder meeting in its review of all deeds
of incorporation and charter amendments.8 Across the water, a commensu-
rate norm of shareholder primacy was prevailing in the American jurispru-
dence and case law until the beginning of the twentieth century.9
2 Alexander Schall,Corporate Governance after the Death of the King – the Origins of the
Separation of Powers in Companies, 8 ECFR 476, 478–80 (2011).
3 Sofie Cools, Europe’s Ius Commune on Director Revocability, 8 ECFR 199, 223–29
(2011).
4 Sabrina Bruno, Directors’ Versus Shareholders’ Primacy in U.S. Corporations Through
the Eyes of History: Is Directors’ Power ‘Inherent’?, 9 ECFR 421, 434–36 (2012) (dis-
cussing the FrenchCommercial Code and the English Joint StockCompanies Act, which
have subsequently been used as a model by many other jurisdictions).
5 With regard to the Prussian statute: Holger Fleischer, Kompetenzen der Hauptver-
sammlung – eine rechtsgeschichtliche, rechtsdogmatische und rechtsvergleichende Bes-
tandsaufnahme, in 2 Aktienrecht imWandel 430, 432 (Walter Bayer & Mathias Hab-
ersack eds., 2007). With regard to the French Code, see next footnote.
6 Art. 31 Code de Commerce of 1807. See also art. 44 and 46 Code de Commerce of 1807.
7 Application of art. 1988 Code Civil pursuant to art. 18 Code de Commerce.
8 René Piret, L’évolution de la législation belge sur les sociétés anonymes 29
(1946). See also Yves De Cordt, L’égalité entre actionnaires 189 (2004).
9 Bruno, supra note 4, at 431–34.
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At the root of the choice for a strong shareholder meeting lay a deep mistrust
of directors,10 understandable in a context where many of the current mech-
anisms to hold directors accountable were still missing. As Adam Smith fa-
mously warned, directors might not be vigilant in dealing with “other people’s
money”.11 Shareholders were seen as owners, a view deemed in line with the
fictitious theory of legal personality.12 Shareholder primacy also fit snugly into
the contractual theory of the corporation, which dominated French legal
thinking during the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century13 and
was explicitly adhered in the French Civil and Commercial Codes.14 Under
this theory, the corporation is a contract between shareholders and is governed
by contract law.15 Accordingly, the wills of the individual shareholders are
determinative in corporate decision-making and there was no role for a sep-
arate, superior corporate interest.16 The shareholder meeting was, therefore,
logically the highest and most powerful corporate body.17 In the contractual
conception of the corporation, directors were qualified as agents (in the legal
meaning of the word),18 a term explicitly used in the French Commercial
Code.19 An important source of inspiration in designing the relationship be-
tween shareholders and directors was, therefore, agency law, which provided
the basis for at will removability of directors.20 In addition, the legislator
consciously copied elements from the political structure of a parliamentary
democracy.21
10 The fear was more specifically that founders would sell overvalued shares, grant them-
selves lifelong mandates as directors and take private benefits (Anne Lefebvre-Teillard,
L’intervention de l’Etat dans la constitution des sociétés anonymes (1807–1867), RHDFE
383, 405–06 (1981); Henri Lévy-Bruhl, Histoire juridique des sociétés de com-
merce en France aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles 52 (1938); Piret, supra note 8, at 35).
11 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and the Causes of the Wealth of
Nations 700 (Modern Library, 1937) (1776).
12 Bruno, supra note 4, at 436–37.
13 Foster, supra note 1, at 589; Jacques Malherbe et al.,Droit des sociétés. Précis 206
(2011); Philippe Merle, Sociétés commerciales 42 (2012); T. Tilquin & V. Simo-
nart, 1 Traité des sociétés 95, 99 (1996).
14 Art. 13 Code Civil of 1804; art. 18 Code de Commerce of 1807.
15 Merle, supra note 13, at 42; Tilquin & Simonart, supra note 13, at 99.
16 De Cordt, supra note 8, at 215;Malherbe et al., supra note 13, at 206.
17 Martin Gelter,Taming or Protecting theModernCorporation? Shareholder-Stakeholder
Debates in a Comparative Light, 7NYU J. L. & Bus. 641, 665, 667 (2011); J.Van Ryn, 1
Principes de droit commercial 320 (1954).
18 Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88
W.Va. L. Rev. 173, 183, 215–216 (1985–86);Tilquin& Simonart, supra note 13, at 100.
19 Art. 31 Code de Commerce of 1807.
20 Art. 2004 Code Civil of 1804.
21 Preparation of the first Belgian corporate law of 1873: Pirmez Report to the Chamber of
November 14, 1868, in Guillery, Commentaire législatif, III, 209, No. 7 (“les so-
ciétés anonymes sont une espèce de petit gouvernement. Le système de notre Constitu-
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At the onset of the twentieth century, boards started to take on a larger role in
practice than the above account would seem to suggest, as shareholder meet-
ings were plagued by apathy, absenteeism and shareholder incompetence.22
Once unfaltering, confidence in shareholder meetings eroded quickly, and
European legislators and Anglo-Saxon courts, increasingly concerned about
economic efficiency, started attributing more authority to the board of direc-
tors.23 During the twentieth century a growing aspiration to protect minority
shareholders from expropriation contributed to this evolution.24 Two-tier
boards were introduced (most notably in Germany and the Netherlands) to
reduce the board’s dependence on controlling shareholders and were used to
allow employee participation.25 In the ambitious harmonization program of
the newly established European Community, the European legislator fol-
lowed suit with similar structures in the (then still) proposed Statute for a
European Company and in the draft Fifth Directive.26 National laws imple-
menting the First Directive assigned boards of directors general power to
represent the company.27
The conception of the corporation evolved simultaneously with the changing
role of the board of directors. The contractual view gave way to the institu-
tional view, which began to appear halfway into the nineteenth century.28
According to the institutional theory, the corporation is a long-standing struc-
ture that is governed by a set of rules the parties cannot modify and which
furthers a common corporate interest over the individual interests of the share-
holders.29 The authority of the corporate bodies under the theory no longer
emanates from an agreement, with the possibility for the shareholder meeting
to delegate authority to the directors, but from the law. Powers are distributed
hierarchically in function of the corporate interest30 and tend to be allocated
tion, dont nous nous trouvons fort bien, est un régime de grande liberté et de grande
publicité; nous proposons de l’appliquer aux sociétés anonymes”). The same was true for
the French Conseil d’Etat: De Cordt, supra note 8, at 188–90.
22 Léon Rycx, 1 Traité juridique et pratique des societies anonymes 220 (1913);
Van Ryn, supra note 17, at 392.
23 Fleischer, supra note 5, at 435; Bruno, supra note 4, at 437–43.
24 Dalia Tsuk Mitchell, Shareholders as Proxies: The Contours of Shareholder Democracy,
63Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1503, 1512–13, 1554–60 (2006).
25 See Klaus J. Hopt, The German Two-Tier Board: Experience, Theories, Reforms, in
Comparative Corporate Governance 227 (Klaus J. Hopt et al. eds., 1998).
26 Art. 73, 137 draft SE Regulation; art. 2 first draft Fifth Directive.
27 Art. 9 First Directive.
28 Isabelle Corbisier, La société: contrat ou institution? 224–226 (2011) (France).
29 Emile Gaillard, La théorie institutionnelle et le fonctionnement de la so-
ciété anonyme 37–43 (1932);Maurice Hauriou, Précis élémentaire de droit admin-
istratif 26 (1943); Van Ryn, supra note 17, at 205–07.
30 De Cordt, supra note 8, at 216; Gaillard, supra note 29, at 39–40.
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generously to the board of directors.31 The directors are no longer qualified
as agents, but as (members of) corporate organs with independent autho-
rity.32 The stronger position of the board is thus also connected with the
organic theory and, more generally, the conception of the legal personhood
as a real entity.33
Towards the end of the twentieth century, the pendulum swung again in the
direction of increased shareholder power, albeit less pronounced in the United
States.34 The early European harmonization efforts of the 1970s and the 1980s,
especially the Second Directive (on capital) and the Third and Sixth Directives
(on domestic mergers and divisions) respectively, had already modestly con-
firmed and sometimes expanded shareholder authority.35 The proposed Fifth
Directive contained several provisions on the internal distribution of powers,36
but was abandoned after long and difficult negotiations.37 It is in the 1990s,
after the takeover wave of the 1980s, that the tide turned in favor of the share-
holder meeting and democratic discourse proliferated once again. At the turn
of the millennium, European corporate law enjoyed a revival and joined in.
The Commission’s Action Plan of 200338 emphasized the need for improved
shareholder democracy, but efforts focused on the one share one vote rule and,
more successfully, procedural shareholder rights,39 rather than on expanding
or consolidating the substantive powers of the general meeting. A remarkable
exception was the planned Takeover Directive, in which shareholder say was a
main theme.40 However, the proposed rule imposing board passivity during
takeovers turned out too revolutionary and was rendered optional in de di-
rective eventually enacted in 2004.41 Inefficiencies and abuses brought to light
by the financial crisis of 2007–08 fueled the demand for more shareholder say,
especially on director and executive compensation. The European Commis-
sion responded with several recommendations42 and a second Action Plan,
31 Gelter, supra note 17, at 665, 667.
32 Merle, supra note 13, at 43; Tilquin & Simonart, supra note 13, at 108; Van Ryn,
supra note 17, at 320. Not all institutionalists welcome the organic theory though
(Corbisier, supra note 28, at 171–72, 185).
33 Bruno, supra note 4, at 438–39; Horwitz, supra note 18, at 183.
34 Mitchell, supra note 24, at 1514, 1572.
35 Fleischer, supra note 5, at 442–44.
36 See art. 37, 48, 50, 55 first draft Fifth Directive, 1972 O.J. (C 131) 49.
37 Withdrawal of obsolete Commission proposals, 2004 O.J. (C 5) 2.
38 Commission Communication of May 21, 2003, Modernising Company Law and En-
hancing Corporate Governance in the European Union – A Plan to Move Forward,
Brussels, COM(2003) 284.
39 E.g. Shareholder Rights Directive 2007/36/EC, 2007 O.J. (L 184) 17.
40 See art. 3 Takeover Directive.
41 Cons. 13 & art. 9 jo. 12 Takeover Directive.
42 Commission Recommendation 2004/913/EC fostering appropriate regime for remu-
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dated December 12, 2012,43 in which it considers imposing a shareholder vote
on director remuneration policies and providing shareholders with better
control over related party transactions.44 Since the financial crisis several
shareholder empowerment efforts have also finally come to fruition in the
United States, with the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act and with corpora-
tions massively moving away from staggered boards and plurality voting in
director elections.45
Throughout history, lawmakers have increasingly been concerned about the
economic efficiency of corporate decision-making. Since they did not, until
recently, disposeof analytical frameworks, let alone reliable empirical evidence,
they sought inspiration in politics and theories of the corporation, which led
them to constitutional law and contract law.Yet, these formonly a slender basis
that does not support building a framework for an efficient allocation of cor-
porate power. The contractual and institutional views of the corporation, and
even compromises between both, servewell as a general descriptive framework
only and do not provide clear enough reference points to play a role at the
normative level.46 Similarly, the comparisonof corporate decision-makingwith
a parliamentary democracy can yield refreshing insights and serve as a source of
inspiration, but does not give any guidance on how to allocate concrete powers
betweencorporatebodies.More importantly,however, aparliamentarydemoc-
racy differs from corporate decision-making in so many key respects that cau-
tion is warranted when drawing any analogy between both: a parliamentary
democracy is an indirect form of democracy, whereas shareholders do vote
directly; voting rights are allocated per share in corporations and per citizen
in a state; shareholders can freely join and leave the companybypurchasing and
selling stock,while leaving is seldomanoption for citizens; unless one adheres a
rigid contractual view of the corporation, shareholders are not the ultimate
neration of directors of listed companies; Commission Recommendation 2009/384 on
remuneration policies in the financial services sector; Commission Recommendation
2009/385 complementing Recommendations 2004/913/EC and 2005/162/EC as regards
the regime for the remuneration of directors of listed companies.
43 Commission Communication of December 12, 2012, Action Plan: European company
law and corporate governance – a modern legal framework for more engaged share-
holders and sustainable companies, COM(2012) 740.
44 Ibid., 10–11. See also European Parliament resolution of March 29, 2012 on a corporate
governance framework for European companies; Statement of the European Corporate
Governance Forum on Related Party Transactions for Listed Entities, March 10, 2011;
Commission Green Paper 2011 – The EU corporate governance framework; Statement
of the European Corporate Governance Forum on Director Remuneration; March 23,
2009.
45 Gelter, supra note 17, at 651–58; Marco Ventoruzzo, Empowering Shareholders in Di-
rectors’ Elections: A Revolution in the Making, 8 ECFR 105, 109–110 (2011).
46 See De Cordt, supra note 8, at 219.
ECFR 2/2014 Shareholder Democracy and Board Autonomy 265
source of power as is said of citizens; and, most important of all, corporations
and states pursue profoundly different goals.47
2. The current academic debate on shareholder say
Economic arguments found their way into the academic debate on sharehold-
er power. Commentators have lined up on both sides of the debate over share-
holder power, putting forward arguments for more or less shareholder power,
or to defend the status quo. Shareholder primacists48 claim that shareholders
have an investment at stake and thus have every interest in obtaining efficient
decisions, adding further that shareholder power is necessary for democratic
corporate decision-making and that the corporation is, in fact, a contract
between shareholders, shareholders that delegate powers to the board as they
see fit. Board primacists protest that shareholders are not specialized enough
and pursue too many divergent interests, to make efficient decisions, whereas
boards are subject to discipline from the market, liability rules and other legal
techniques. Directors would also be better positioned to defend the interests
of other constituencies than shareholders. Apart from the democratic and
contractual arguments (which have been refuted in the previous Section), all
these arguments are absolutely valid, andwill for that reason be included in the
further analysis in this article.
There are additional arguments that often recur in debates, but as these are
unconvincing, they are left aside here. One of these is the argument that the
existing distribution of power in American corporations has long served the
47 Peter Böckli, Aktionärsdemokratie: ein Schlagwort mit Schlagseite, GesKR 2013, 179;
Holger Fleischer, Aktionärsdemokratie versus Verwaltungsmacht: Empowering
Shareholders oder Director Primacy?, in Konvergenzen und Divergenzen im deut-
schen, österreichischen und schweizerischen Gesellschafts- und Kapital-
marktrecht 81, 115 (Holger Fleischer et al. eds. 2011); Thomas W. Joo, “Corporate
Governance and the D-Word”, 63 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1586, 1587–88 (2006); Usha
Rodrigues, The Seductive Comparison of Shareholder and Civic Democracy, 63Wash.
&LeeL.Rev. 1389, 1399–1400 (2006); Robert B. Thompson&PaulH. Edelman,Corpo-
rateVoting,62Vand.L.Rev.129,136(2009);Hans-UeliVogt,Aktionärsdemokratie
9(2012);Hans-UeliVogt,Aktionärsdemokratie–ÜberdieMöglichkeitenundGrenzen
der Verwirklichung eines politischen Leitbildes im Aktienrecht, mit besonderer Berück-
sichtigung derVorschläge für eineRevision des schweizerischenAktienrechts inKonver-
genzen undDivergenzen im deutschen, österreichischen und schweizerischen
Gesellschafts- undKapitalmarktrecht 3, 12–14 (Holger Fleischer et al. eds. 2011).
48 This termwill be used to indicate advocates of shareholder empowerment, although one
could technical distinguish between primacy and power (Stephen M. Bainbridge, Di-
rector Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97Nw. U. L. Rev. 547
(2003)).
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American economy well, the success of which would evidence that American
corporate law is efficient as is.49 Both premises as well as the conclusion of this
argument are flawed: Part I, Section 1 has demonstrated that the distribution
of powers has not always been as it is today and the recent crisis casts doubt on
the supposed optimal efficiency of the American economy. In addition, a
strong economy is also as likely (if not more) to be the consequence of many
other legal, economic, political and other factors.50 A second indecisive argu-
ment is the claim that shareholders are, or are not, owners of the corporation.
While the comparison with ownership has at least some surface appeal, it must
be said that shareholders are not exactly owners in the legal sense, and espe-
cially do not behave as such in public companies.51 The “owner” label one does
or does not attach to shareholders can hardly be a criterion to justify more or
less shareholder power.52
A constraint of the more valid arguments mentioned above is that they are
mostly used to increase or reduce shareholder power in a given legal system,
but that if that happened, they could be used again for even more, or even less
shareholder power. What we need is a general framework for an efficient
distribution of powers that allows for drawing a line indicating how far all
of these arguments can take shareholder or board power.
A now-classic theoretical framework on corporate decision-making was of-
fered by Fama and Jensen. They argue that in organizations with many re-
sidual claimants, it is efficient for these residual claimants to delegate decision-
making, because they are better at bearing residual risk, while directors are
better at decision-making, subject to external monitoring from the market.
This separation of risk bearing from decision making leads to a separation of
decision control (i.e. ratification and monitoring) and decision management
(i.e. initiation and implementation of decisions) at all levels of the firm. Deci-
sions are thus made within the firm, although shareholders retain the right to
elect directors and to ratify a few decisions.53 Another standard framework is
49 E.g. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119
Harv. L. Rev. 1735, 1739–40 (2006); Martin Lipton &William Savitt, TheManyMyths
of Lucian Bebchuk, 93 Va. L. Rev. 733, 734 (2007).
50 Lucian A. Bebchuk, Letting Shareholders Set the Rules, 119Harv. L. Rev. 1784, 1791–
92 (2006).
51 Hans-Ueli Vogt, Aktionärsdemokratie 29–30 (2012). See however David
C. Donald, Shareholder Voice And Its Opponents, 5 J. Corp. L. Stud. 305 (2005).
52 Grant Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, Shareholder Democracy and the Curious Turn
Toward Board Primacy, 51 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 2071, 2083 (2010); Lipton & Savitt,
supra note 49, at 754.
53 Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. &
Econ. 301 (1983); Eugene F. Fama &Michael C. Jensen,Agency Problems and Residual
Claims, 26 J.L. & Econ. 327 (1983).
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the team production theory formulated by Blair and Stout. They focus instead
on various interests that are concerned in corporate decision-making, includ-
ing those of non-shareholder constituents. In Blair and Stout’s depiction of the
corporation, the board acts as a mediator between these various interests,
serving a broadly understood notion of corporate welfare.54 Less extreme is
Bainbridge’s conception of the board as “a platonic guardian – a sui generis
body serving as the nexus for the various contracts making up the corporation
and whose powers flow not from shareholders alone, but from the complete
set of contracts constituting the firm”, but still striving to maximize share-
holder value.55
These frameworks are enlightening as a general view of the corporation and
seem to favor the board of directors in the allocation of corporate decision-
making power, but they do not provide any guidance on precisely which
powers should remain with the shareholder meeting. Bratton and Wachter,
as well as Harris and Raviv, are more concrete when they describe the distri-
bution of powers as a balancing exercise between agency costs within the
board (see Part II, Section 1) and the informational disadvantage of the share-
holder meeting. Only Harris and Raviv develop this insight into workable
criteria but, as will be shown further, overlook some other important factors
than incentives and informational differences.56 Dallas sees a role for control
issues and conflicts of interest in the voting system, but mainly to explain
requirements of approval by disinterested members.57
Several authors have attempted to categorize the matters for which the share-
holder meeting should be competent in public companies. Eisenberg argues
that, on the basis of the different skills between directors (business skills)
and shareholders (investment skills), the economic significance of the matter,
and the frequency and urgency of the decision, business decisions should be
taken by board and management, while structural decisions and decisions
regarding the control of the corporation should be taken by the shareholder
54 Margaret Blair & Lynn Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 Va.
L. Rev. 247 (1999).
55 Bainbridge, supra note 48, at 560; Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of Directors as
Nexus of Contracts, 88 Iowa L. Rev. 1, 33 (2002). More extreme is the proposal of a self-
perpetuating board, which is completely free from shareholder oversight, in order to
allow it to strive for the company’s long-term interests: Lawrence E.Mitchell,ACritical
Look at Corporate Governance, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 1263, 1272 (1992).
56 William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empower-
ment, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 653, 659–60, 665–66 (2010); Milton Harris & Artur Raviv,
Control of Corporate Decisions: Shareholders vs. Management, 23 Rev. Fin. St. 4115
(2010).
57 Lynne L. Dallas, The Control and Conflict of Interest Voting Systems, 71N.C.L. Rev. 1,
71 (1992).
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meeting.58 In a more recent proposal to improve American corporate law,
Bebchuk advocates shareholder intervention power for two categories of
decisions: (1) decisions to amend the corporate charter or to change the
company’s state of incorporation, in order to provide some counterweight
to the practical advantage management has in corporate decision-making, and
(2) business decisions of substantial importance, namely decisions to merge,
sell all assets, or dissolve the company and decisions which reduce the com-
pany’s size by ordering a cash or in-kind distribution. Shareholder power for
these matters would be founded on the fact that agency costs (see Part II,
Section 1) in these decisions are particularly high.59 On the European side
of the debate, Vogt advances three factors that should guide the allocation
of powers between the board and the shareholder meeting. The task must
fit:
(1) the function of the organ as it results from evolution and economic logic
(mainly the shareholders’ role as providers of capital financing, their limited
liability, the fact that decisions of the shareholder meeting are practically
limited to binary choice between yes or no, and, for the board, its role as
the centralized decision-maker that is subject to fiduciary duties),
(2) the form of each corporate organ (its composition, size, decision-making
procedure and information available), and
(3) the relative appropriateness for the task of the corporate body in the
corporate system.60
While the last views point to essential factors in an efficient distribution of
powers, it is still not entirely clear how to balance the different factors and turn
them into workable criteria that can be applied consistently to all matters that
come up during a company’s life cycle. Building on extant literature, such a
consistency is precisely what the following Part will attempt to establish.
III. An economically efficient criterion for allocating corporate power
The first Part has shown that, although lawmakers were concerned about
economic efficiency in designing the corporate decision-making structure,
they had no clear criterion by which to achieve this goal. In the meantime, a
58 Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of Shareholders and Managers in Corporate
Decisionmaking, 57 Cal. L. Rev. 1, 10–13, 59–60 (1969).
59 Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118Harv. L. Rev. 833
(2005).
60 Vogt, in Konvergenzen und Divergenzen, supra note 47, at 21–40; Hans-Ueli
Vogt, Aktionärsdemokratie 23–45, 73–81 (2012).
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wealth of economic analytical tools and empirical evidence is now at our
disposal. This Part will use this new knowledge to advance criteria for an
economically efficient distribution of corporate powers. It will be argued that
the key lies in a combined transaction cost and agency cost approach and that
this leads to criteria based on what I call “inherent” conflicts of interest. This
Part then ends with a brief application of these criteria.
1. An integrated view on transaction costs and agency costs
In Coase’s theory of the firm, the reason of existence for firms lies in the cost
associated with the use of the price mechanism that steers the markets. In the
market, actors have to search for providers of the desired products, bargain for
an agreement, and enforce it – all of which entail “transaction costs”. By
replacing negotiations in the market with decisions based on authority within
the institutional framework of the firm, these costs can be significantly re-
duced.61 What is lesser known, however, is that transaction costs do not only
exist in the market (external transaction costs), but also within every contrac-
tual relationship and every firm (internal transaction costs).62 The “transac-
tion” can thus refer both to a contractual transaction in a market environment,
but also to more institutional forms of economic coordination.63 Some econ-
omists took the argument a bit further and opined that the firm is nothing
more than a nexus of contracts with shareholders, employees, creditors, sup-
pliers, etc.64 In any event, the finding that transaction costs also occur within
the firm demonstrates the relevance of Coase’s theory to the internal distri-
bution of corporate powers.
The transaction cost theory falls short in that it assumes that managers ex-
clusively pursue the corporate interest. Agency theory fills this gap by build-
ing on the claim of the managerial theory that managers (and directors) max-
61 Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, Economica 386, 390 (1937), reprinted in
Ronald Coase, The Firm, The Market, and The Law 33, 38 (1988); Ronald Coase,
The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & Econ. 1, 15–19 (1960).
62 See Steven N.S. Cheung, A Theory of Share Tenancy (1969). In the neoclassical
theory, the notion of transaction costs remained restricted to costs of market trans-
actions between firms or individuals (Douglas W. Allen, Transaction Costs, in Ency-
clopedia of Law and Economics, I. The History and Methodology of Law and
Economics 893, 902–03, 904–06 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000).
63 M. Klaes, History of Transaction Costs, in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Eco-
nomics (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2nd ed. 2008).
64 Frank Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate
Law 12 (1996); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Man-
agerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305, 310–11
(1976).
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imize their own utility.65 Agency is to be understood broadly here as every
relationship in which one party – the agent – performs a service on behalf of
the other party – the principal – and which entails a certain delegation of
decision-making power.66 In corporate law, the so-called “first” agency pro-
blem refers to the relationship between directors and shareholders when the
latter are not directors themselves (regarding the influence of the “second” and
the “third” agency problem, see Part III, Sections 3 and 4). In case of such a
separation of ownership and control, managers and directors (seen as agents)
do not always have an interest in pursuing the interest of the shareholders
(seen as the principal) as they do not receive all profits or bear all costs that
they generate for it.67 All profits forgone and costs incurred by the divergence
of interests between principal and agent are called agency costs.68 The first
agency conflict is more intense the more fragmented the shareholder basis
because dispersed shareholders generally loosen the reins.69
To integrate the transaction cost theory and the agency theory, one has to keep
in mind the different focus of each theory. While agency theory studies the
individual and his incentives, the transaction cost theory analyses and com-
pares transactions.70 To a large extent, each theory therefore spotlights a cost of
which the other theory does not take notice and to this extent both theories are
complementary.71 Nevertheless, some similarities exist between both, result-
ing in overlaps between the notions of agency costs and transaction costs.
Which label to stick on these costs is then purely a question of semantics.72
What is clear, however, is that the company is internally confronted both with
transaction costs and with agency costs. In the context of decision-making in
the boardroom and within the shareholder meeting, the transaction costs are
65 William J.Baumol,Business Behavior, Value andGrowth (1959) (managers striv-
ing for revenues rather than profits); Robin Marris, The Economic Theory of
‘Managerial’ Capitalism (1964) (managers focusing too much on growth); Oliver
E.Williamson, The Economics of Discretionary Behavior: ManagerialObjec-
tives in a Theory of the Firm (1964) (managers taking private benefits).
66 Jensen &Meckling, supra note 64, at 308–09;Martin Hellwig,On the Economics and
Politics of Corporate Finance and Corporate Control, in Corporate Governance:
Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives 103 (Xavier Vives ed., 2000).
67 J. Armour et al., Agency Problems and Legal Strategies, in The Anatomy of Corpo-
rate Law 36 (R. Kraakman et al. eds., 2nd ed. 2009).
68 These include monitoring costs, bonding costs, and residual loss (Jensen & Meckling,
supra note 64, at 308).
69 Armour et al., supra note 67, at 52.
70 Oliver E.Williamson, The Mechanisms of Governance 179 (1996).
71 See also Jensen & Meckling, supra note 64, at 308.
72 See Harold Demsetz, The Theory of the Firm Revisited, 4 J. L. Econ. & Org. 141, 144–
45 (1988).
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not exactly contracting costs but rather “decision-making costs”.73 Decision-
making costs include costs of gathering and processing information, deliber-
ation, and decision by a meeting of shareholders or directors, assuming they
exclusively pursue the corporate interest. Costs arising from them pursuing
their private interest and from attempts to reduce these costs will be indicated
as agency costs.
2. Cost comparison of board and shareholder meeting
With regard to decision-making costs, the board of directors has an obvious
edge over the shareholder meeting: the board is easier to convene, its members
are more specialized and have better access to information, fewer have to
process information, and information can be kept confidential.74 Convening
a shareholder meeting, by contrast, is costly in many more ways than the
practical expenses of notice. Shareholders are (generally) not nearly as speci-
alized and knowledgeable about the company’s situation;75 shareholders will
often not bother going through all of the information available; and any in-
formation shared with shareholders of a public company will likely be read by
competitors in the first place. The costs of sound decision-making by the
shareholders themselves (see Part III, Section 2 regarding proxy advising) will
always remain prohibitively high in a public company.76 Even when new
communication techniques can ensure free delivery of information and dis-
tance voting, a large crowd of shareholders would still have to process infor-
73 See e.g. D. Gordon Smith, The Role of Shareholders in the Modern American Corpo-
ration, in Research Handbook on the Economics of Corporate Law 52 (Claire
A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell eds., 2012). The notion of ”governance costs” (e.g. used
by Luca Enriques et al., The Basic Governance Structure: The Interests of Shareholders
as a Class, in The Anatomyof Corporate Law 55, 72, n. 93 (R.Kraakman et al. eds.,
2nd ed. 2009)) will not be employed here, because it is often understood to also cover
agency costs (e.g. Jeffrey N. Gordon, Pathways to Corporate Convergence? Two Steps
on the Road to Shareholder Capitalism in Germany, 5. Colum. J. Eur. L. 219, 222
(1998–99)) and as a consequence it does not allow to weigh decision-making costs
against agency costs.
74 See Bainbridge, supra note 49, at 1745–46, 1749; Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward a True
Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist Response to Bebchuk’s Solution for Improving
Corporate America, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1759, 1763 (2006).
75 See Bratton &Wachter, supra note 56, at 688–709 (arguing that shareholders rely on the
information included in the stock price, but that in the absence of a strong-form efficient
capital market, this leads to inefficient decisions). See however Lucian A. Bebchuk, The
Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 973, 978 (2002)
(arguing that informational disadvantages can often be overcome by means of well-
designed legal rules on communicating information to the shareholders).
76 See Henry Hansmann, The Ownership of Enterprise 40–42 (1996).
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mation and form opinions on sometimes highly complex matters. All solu-
tions that have been put forward so far, such as attendance fees, or an enhanced
role for institutional investors and proxy advisors, trigger their own costs (see
also Part III, Section 2). From the perspective of decision-making costs, one
can conclude, the company benefits from allocating as many powers as pos-
sible to the board of directors.
From the perspective of the costs stemming from the first agency conflict, yet,
the shareholdermeeting is in a better position to decide. Conventional wisdom
(see Part III for some qualifications) dictates that shareholders have the best
incentives to promote the corporate interest77 because they are residual claim-
ants or, formulated negatively, residual risk bearers.78 Indeed, shareholders are
only entitled to share in whatever is left of the profits after payment of cred-
itors’ fixed claims. Shareholders therefore have every interest in the company
being able to pay off its debts and even earning more than that, and to con-
tribute to that by making efficient decisions and monitoring both the board
and management.79 Directors, on the contrary, do not have any such natural
incentives from their position alone. As the above description of the first
agency conflict made evident, directors frequently have very different interests
than maximizing corporate value.
3. Conflicts of interest as normative criterion
With the two main cost concepts under our belt, it is easier to discern the key
elements that should guide the allocation of decision-making authority be-
77 E.g. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J. L. &
Econ. 395, 403–04 (1983);William T. Allen et al.,Commentaries andCases on the
Law of Business Organization 452 (3rd ed. 2009).
78 In an unpublished paper, Black argues that stakeholders are residual claimants too:
Bernard S. Black, Corporate Law and Residual Claimants, Stanford Law and Econom-
ics Olin Working Paper 2001, No. 217 (available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/paper-
s.cfm?abstract_id=1528437). Hayden and Bodie argue that the residual claim of the
shareholders should not be taken for granted, and that because of shareholders’ increas-
ing heterogeneity stakeholders should receive voting rights as well (Grant Hayden &
Matthew Bodie, Arrow’s Theorem and the Exclusive Shareholder Franchise, 62 Vand.
L. Rev. 1217 (2009); Hayden & Bodie, supra note 52). See also Andrew Keay, Share-
holder Primacy in Corporate Law: Can it Survive? Should it Survive?, 7 ECFR 369,
378–80 (2010).
79 Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on a Modern Regulatory
Framework for Company Law in Europe, November 4, 2002, 47; Armen A. Alchian &
Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 Am.
Econ. Rev. 777, 782 (1972); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 64, at 67–70, 72;
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 77, at 408; Fama & Jensen, supra note 53, at 301–03.
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tween directors and shareholders. While it is almost impossible to quantify
andmathematically compare agency and transaction costs – howmuch value is
lost when thousands of shareholders have to process information and/or make
a suboptimal decision? –, we do know some factors that affect their relative
importance: the subject matter of the decision and the number of shareholders.
Transaction costs, or, in this context, decision-making costs, fluctuate with the
number of shareholders. For lawmakers, this could certainly justify a distinc-
tion between public and private firms, but within public companies (the group
investigated in this article) it can hardly be a criterion of distinction because
they have numerous shareholders in any case80 and a distinction would not be
practically feasible. The subject matter of a decision, in contrast, and in par-
ticular the question whether the matter involves divergent interests of direc-
tors, has a tremendous influence on agency costs even within the category of
public corporations. The decisive criterion in an efficient distribution of
powersmust therefore bewhether directors have conflicts of interest in a given
matter.
In matters where the incentives of directors do not diverge from those of the
shareholders, the costs of the first agency conflict, when the board of directors
makes the decision, remain limited. Relatively speaking, the higher decision-
making costs of the shareholder meeting then weigh heavier and board author-
ity is warranted. Conversely, in matters where directors’ interests are opposed
to those of the shareholders, agency costs amplify and, as board decisions
could be tainted by personal interests, directors’ superior information and
specialization advantage loses its value.81
Directors’ conflicts of interest can either relate to the essence of a decision or
to a side aspect of it. A decision that directly concerns the director’s interest is
important enough by its nature to justify a shareholder vote. Section 5 will
show that there are not only direct effects on agency costs involved in making
such a decision (ex post agency costs), but that shareholder power can also
substantially curb agency costs without being exercised effectively (ex ante
agency costs), while the transaction costs associated with the decision remain
relatively low. In matters where directors do not face conflicting interests with
respect to the essence of the decision, but only with respect to a side aspect of
the decision, this oblique conflict can still induce a director to make an in-
efficient overall decision. Provided that the decision is material for the com-
pany, such an indirect conflict of interest can also affect shareholder value to
such an extent as to make decision-making by the shareholder meeting advis-
able. Moreover, the materiality of a decision can also influence decision-mak-
80 The existence of a controlling shareholder is a different matter, which will be discussed
in Part III, Section 3.
81 Bebchuk, supra note 75, at 999–1004.
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ing costs. Important decisions, such as restructurings, become less of a man-
agement decision and resemble investment decisions, in which shareholders
are not, as a rule, less specialized than directors and managers.82 Importance is
also likely to motivate more shareholders to win over the collective action
problem and to effectively participate in the vote.83 Conversely, organizing a
shareholder meeting is not worth the high decision-making costs for small
decisions, such as daily management,84 even if they cause small agency costs.
Shareholders should, for that reason, not micromanage the firm’s manage-
ment.85
4. Difference with conflict of interest procedures and related party transactions
A critical reader might object that corporate laws have special regulations on
conflicts of interest and related party transactions and that power allocation
must for that reason be based on different criteria. Yet, there is a crucial
distinction between the above-defended criterion of conflicting interests and
those targeted by conflict of interest procedures and rules on related party
transactions (even if the related party is a director). The divergence of interests
that justifies shareholder power is inherent to the position of director in the
company that makes the decision, given the subject matter of the decision. It is
the mere fact of being a director that causes the conflict of interest on matters
like director remuneration. As a consequence, the entire board will, in prin-
ciple, be conflicted each time decisions need to be made in those matters. The
conflicts of interest in the sense of the special procedures and related party
transactions are fundamentally different. They are not inherently related to the
subject matter of the decision,86 but result instead from concrete circumstan-
ces, like the director’s other functions (in the same or in another company), his
personal relationships, the fact that he is a counterparty to the agreement being
decided on, etc. As a consequence, these conflicts of interest do, in principle,
not affect all board members.
Two precisions are in order at this stage. First, for there to be an inherent
conflict of interest, a decision need not relate to all board members. Even a
decision formally concerning only one director may create conflicting inter-
ests for all directors when the same kind of decision needs to bemade for them,
82 Eisenberg, supra note 58, at 50; Fleischer, supra note 5, at 448.
83 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 77, at 416; Eisenberg, supra note 58, at 50.
84 See Allen et al, supra note 77, at 451.
85 Roger Barker, Ownership Structure and Shareholder Engagement: Reflections on the
Role of Institutional Shareholders in the Financial Crisis, in Corporate Governance
and the Global Financial Crisis 144, 148 (William Sun et al. eds., 2011).
86 Merle, supra note 13, at 477–78.
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such as a decision on remuneration. In these kinds of decisions, directors risk
mutually supporting each other’s generous remuneration merely with a view
to receiving the same support when their own compensation package is tabled.
This phenomenon of mutual backscratching is said to effectively occur in
jurisdictions where director remuneration is determined by the board of di-
rectors, like the United States.87 Second, the above explanation regularly in-
cludes the qualification “in principle”. This is because the assessment of in-
herent conflicts of interest is made in abstracto. It does not matter whether
directors are, in fact, driven by their conflicting interests in a given situation, or
whether their biased opinion has influenced the eventual decision.
The different natures of the two described types of conflicts of interest call for
different legal strategies to deal with each of them. The conflicts of interest
procedure and rules on related party transactions therefore do not make the
authority of the shareholder meeting redundant as a strategy to deal with
inherent conflicts and, as we will see, in fact support the validity of the crite-
rion of inherent conflicts of interest.
The strategies employed by conflict of interest procedures and related party
transactions rules can be divided into roughly three categories. The first cat-
egory contains information and justification requirements for conflicted per-
sons and boards with conflicted directors, which is mostly part of a larger
procedure.88 The second category requires conflicted persons to abstain from
deliberation and/or voting; rules within this category are usually mandatory,89
but only encouraged in the United States, where approval by disinterested
directors can, under certain conditions, both shift and heighten the burden of
proof if the decision is challenged in court.90 The third category shifts author-
ity to another corporate body when directors face conflicting interests. This
technique is mainly used in two-tiered boards, e.g. in Germany91 and the
87 With regard to CEO remuneration: Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse Fried, Pay without
Performance: Overview of the Issues, 30 J. Corp. L. 647, 654–59 (2005).
88 SeeLuca Enriques et al.,Related Party Transactions, inTheAnatomyofCorporate
Law 153, 155–61 (Reinier Kraakman et al. eds., 2nd ed. 2009); Klaus J. Hopt,Conflict of
Interest, Secrecy and Insider Information of Directors, A Comparative Analysis, 10
ECFR 167, 186 (2013).
89 E.g. art. 2:129, § 6& 2:140, § 5DutchCivil Code (as recently amended); art. L225–40, § 1
& L. 225–86, § 1 French Commercial Code (for so-called “regulated agreements”); art.
523 § 1 Belgian Companies Code (for public companies).
90 Allen et al., supra note 77, at 314–26; Eric G. Orlinsky, Corporate Opportunity Doc-
trine and Interested Director Transactions: A Framework for Analysis in an Attempt to
Restore Predictability, 24 Del. J. Corp. L. 451, 519 (1999).
91 The supervisory boardmust represent the company inmatters in which amember of the
executive board is a counterparty (§ 112 AktG). It is assumed that the supervisory board
then also acquires decision-making power (2Münchener Kommentar zum Aktien-
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Netherlands,92 where a conflict within the management board shifts the deci-
sion to the supervisory board. Less drastic is the solution whereby the deci-
sion-making authority is only moved partially, i.e. the board still makes the
decision, but it must obtain approval from another body and/or specific (e.g.
independent) members of the board.93 Only in exceptional cases of conflicts of
interest within the board will the decision-making authority shift to the share-
holder meeting.94 This is mostly a second order solution, occurring when
decision-making by the board is paralyzed because too many directors are
excluded from participating due to conflicts of interest (see further in this
Section).
Of all these strategies, only the very last one can effectively address inherent
conflicts of interest. The first category – the information and justification
obligation – is useless because an inherent conflict affects all directors and
does not depend on the concrete circumstances; everyone is, in any case, aware
of the conflict. Neither will a statement by the conflicted director have a
disciplining effect – the other directors will not discount the conflicted direc-
tor’s opinion if they have similar interests. The same holds for requiring ab-
stention or partial shifts of competence. Since all directors are, in principle,
conflicted, there would be none left to make the decision.
The last strategy – moving authority to the shareholder meeting – is precisely
what has been defended above for inherent conflict of interest. Not surpris-
ingly, this strategy is used in conflict of interest situations and related party
transactions that, despite not being inherent conflicts of interest, closely re-
semble them, namely when all directors, or at least a majority of them, have
conflicting interests.95 In these situations, the authority of the shareholder
meeting is prescribed for instance in the new Dutch conflict of interest
gesetz, § 112, No. 20 (Wulf Goette & Mathias Habersack eds., 2011). See also Uwe
Huffer, Aktiengesetz § 112, No. 4 (2012)).
92 In theNetherlands, this is the case when the abstention duty renders decision-making in
the executive board impossible, unless the articles of association stipulate otherwise
(Art. 2:139, § 6 Dutch Civil Code).
93 E.g. art. 10& 21 pAmended Proposal for a FifthDirective, 1983O.J. (C 240) 2; art. 225–
40 & 225–88 French Commercial Code (for so-called “regulated agreements”).
94 OECD, Related Party Transactions and Minority Shareholder Rights, Parijs, OECD
Publishing, 2012, 34; Luca Enriques et al., supra note 88, at 166–67; Hopt, supra note 88,
at 187.
95 Related party transactions with controlling shareholders are a special case. Because the
shareholder controls the composition of the board, one might conjecture that all board
members are conflicted. Moving the decision to the shareholder meeting will not be of
much avail though, because of the controlling shareholder’s weight in the vote, and
special majority requirements would create a risk of opportunistic hold-up by minority
shareholders (see Enriques et al, supra note 88, at 179–82). Independent directorsmay be
the best solution, since the conflict is not inherent to the position of director.
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regime96 and has also been advocated more generally in Belgian legal doc-
trine.97 In Delaware, the possibility to table the decision in the shareholder
meeting is not legally limited to situations where all directors are conflicted,
but it is mainly used in those cases.98 It is on the basis of a similar reasoning,
that the German conflict of interest provisions shift authority from the man-
agement board to the supervisory board even if just one member of the former
is conflicted (see above). The underlying idea is that other members of the
management board would not be able to decide objectively about a transaction
in which a colleague is involved.99 Somehow this could be read as a drastic
application of the rule that when all directors are conflicted, authority should
transfer to another corporate body. In the context of the German dual board,
this is a reasonable choice because a transfer to the supervisory board causes
fewer transaction costs than a transfer to a shareholder meeting (the only
option in a monistic structure). Correspondingly, dual tier structures also
allow more flexibility in the allocation of powers in response to inherent
conflicts of interest (see Part III).
When the law responds to concrete conflicts of interest by shifting authority, it
exhibits the same intuition as the one that underlies the power allocation
model advocated here, namely that shifting authority is the best solution when
(almost) all directors are conflicted. The difference between inherent conflicts
of interest and concrete conflicts of interest that exceptionally affect (nearly)
all directors is in the cause of the conflict, the first being systematic and the
second depending on concrete circumstances. For the latter, the law cannot but
rely on the directors themselves to apply a procedure in which they assess who
is conflicted to decide if authority must shift to another organ; for the former,
the law can directly give authority over to the shareholder meeting (or, in a
dual system, the supervisory board). The criterion of inherent conflicts of
interest thus fits well into the existing legal framework and is, in fact, an
application of its underlying principles.
96 Art. 2:140, § 5 Dutch Civil Code.
97 P.-A. Foriers, Les situations de blocage dans les sociétés anonymes, TBH 466, 470 (1992);
F. Hellemans, De algemene vergadering 554 (2001); H. Laga, Belangenconflicten,
aantal bestuurders en schriftelijke besluitvorming in de N.V., in De nieuwe Vennoot-
schapswetten van 7 en 13 april 1995, 175, 194 (1995); Jan Ronse, Algemeen deel
405 (1975); J.-F. Tossens & C. Bertsch, Les situations de blocage au sein du conseil
d’administration de la société anonyme à la suite de l’application de l’article 60
L.C.S.C. relatif à la dualité d’intérêts, Rev. Prat. Soc. 32, 36–37 (1995); J. Verhaert,
Patstellingen in vennootschappen, RW 161, 171–72 (1994–95).
98 Orlinsky, supra note 90, at 465.
99 MünchenerKommentar, supra note 91, at § 112, No. 1; Huffer, supra note 91, at § 112,
No. 1.
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5. A brief application
Conflicts of interest inherent to the function of directors can arise in decisions
that directly or indirectly concern the position of director, directors’ personal
benefits or disadvantages, and/or the scope of their power.100 The following
sketch is by no means an exhaustive account of all respective powers of the
shareholder meeting and the board of directors. How the powers of the share-
holder meeting should be framed exactly, and whether delegation possibilities,
demand requirements and similar techniques of cooperation with the board
should be allowed, extends beyond the scope of this article.
In certain matters, directors’ interests are directly opposed to the corporate
interest. The position of the directors is obviously directly concerned in de-
cisions on their election and dismissal, in which case the conflicting interests
are apparent.101 At the same time, the board’s transaction cost advantage is
relatively low in the choice of a director, as it does not require much special-
ization or time investment. An additional reason for shareholder authority in
appointment and removal decisions is that it curbs agency costs ex ante. In-
deed, removal is not only a powerful remedy against poorly performing di-
rectors, but the mere threat of removal also has a disciplining effect.102 The
potential for a shareholder meeting to remove directors is further crucial for
the takeover market to function properly and have a disciplining effect. For
these reasons, directors should not be able to decide on their own position, or
to influence a shareholder decision (in otherwords, partiallymake the decision
themselves) throughmechanisms such as extravagant severance payment com-
mitments or staggered boards. Themarkets would not even be able to properly
sanction any such restrictions of shareholder power, precisely because these
restrictions erode the discipline effect of the markets.103
In the category of directors’ personal benefits and advantages, decisions on
director remuneration and liability claims against directors engender inherent
conflicts of interest. Because these decisions are technically complex and costly
100 See also, in the context of the choice between mandatory and default law, Lucian
A. Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competi-
tion in Corporate Law, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1435, 1461 (1992) (”there are two types of
issues with respect towhichmarket discipline can hardly be relied on to inducemanagers
to seek value-maximizing rules. These two types of issues are those that are ‘significantly
redistributive’ and those that directly affect the strength of market discipline.”); Melvin
A. Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89Colum. L. Rev. 1461, 1472 (1989)
(delineating a comparable category of “positional conflicts” and arguing that legal
provisions dealing with these conflict should be mandatory).
101 See e.g. Report of the High Level Group, supra note 79, at 60.
102 Bebchuk, supra note 59, at 878; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 64, at 76.
103 Bebchuk, supra note 100, at 1468.
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in terms of transaction costs,104 shareholders may not have to agree with all
details, but should still have a say.105 Finally, the scope of directors’ power is at
stake in decisions on the payment of dividends. Specifically, dividend payouts
reduce the freedom for directors to pursue projects of their choice.106
Sometimes the inherent conflict of interest does not relate to the essence of the
decision, but only to an aspect of it. In these matters, as discussed above, the
decision should belong to the shareholder meeting if the decision itself is
material to the company. Material decisions include fundamental changes to
the company, in which case even side conflicts may give rise to significant
agency costs. Indeed, the “reduction of agency costs is the most probable
explanation for shareholders’ voting on fundamental corporate changes.
Shareholders, as residual claimants, have the most to lose (or to gain) as a
result of fundamental corporate changes. Moreover, the possibility of large
gain or loss in these transactions because of their size is sufficient to overcome
the collective action problems, particularly for institutional investors, that
would make voting on ordinary business decisions meaningless.”107
Most jurisdictions do indeed require a shareholder vote for structural changes
that are large and that may create conflicts of interest for directors.108 Funda-
mental changes, like mergers, dissolutions, and takeover defenses, almost in-
variably present conflicting interests for directors and managers.109 Although
directors and managers derive benefits from pursuing value-generating proj-
ects,110 they also face inherent conflicts of interest obliquely when a merger or
dissolution is on the table or when the company is the target of a takeover bid.
First, these transactions risk reducing their control over the corporation111
and, in the case of dissolution, will automatically terminate their mandate.
Consequently, a shareholder vote on a merger in practice often boils down
to a confidence vote or a mid-term election.112 Second, in these transactions,
directors may try to negotiate personal benefits, like an increase in pay or a
generous departure compensation, and risk basing their ultimate decision on
whether or not to consummate the transaction on these side benefits instead of
104 Fleischer, supra note 47, at 102.
105 Hans-Ueli Vogt, Aktionärsdemokratie 44, 50–59 (2012).
106 Bebchuk, supra note 59, at 903–04;Michael C. Jensen,Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow,
Corporate Finance and Takeovers, 76 Am. Econ. Rev. 323 (1986).
107 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 77, at 416.
108 Edward Rock et al., Fundamental Changes, in The Anatomy of Corporate Law
183, 184 (Reinier Kraakman et al. eds., 2nd ed. 2009).
109 Eisenberg, supra note 58, at 27–30; Rock et al., supra note 108, at 199–202.
110 Richard P. Castanias & Constance E. Helfat, Managerial and Windfall Rents in the
Market for Corporate Control, 18 J. Econ. Behavior & Org. 153 (1992).
111 Bebchuk, supra note 59, at 897–99.
112 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 77, at 416.
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the efficiency of the transaction.113 It is because of these conflicting interests
that shareholders are better positioned to decide on mergers, dissolutions and
the company’s response to takeover bids (including ex ante measures such as
poison pills).
Inherent conflicts of interest also arise when a company seeks to acquire
another company or to invest in important assets. Such acquisitions, if suc-
cessful, have side benefits in terms of directors’ power and prestige as the
directors will then be leading a larger firm (empire building) and with this
often comes an increase in their remuneration, if based on factors like sales
growth or turnover.114 Combined with the bias against disgorging cash to
shareholders (see above), this may lead directors and managers of firms with
free cash flow to prefer inefficient acquisitions over dividend distributions.
Moreover, acquisitions entail indirect agency costs in that they intensify the
conflict of interest between board and management on the one hand and
shareholders on the other hand.115Not only is it mostly associatedwith further
dispersion of stock ownership, but also the diversification of activities allows
the company to reduce the volatility of its revenues, thus increasing the like-
lihood of the company’s survival and safeguarding directors’ positions.116
The proposed framework is not limited to supporting the authority of the
shareholder meeting. In the absence of conflicts of interest and/or materiality,
board authority is the more efficient option. The amendment of the company’s
articles of association is a good illustration of the different consequences of the
proposed criterion. In continental Europe, companies typically have one con-
stitutional document, which can be amended only by the shareholder meet-
ing.117 However, these articles of association often include provisions of which
the board of directors can more easily take care than the shareholder meeting
and in which no conflict of interest is present, such as the name of the com-
pany, the accounting year, the precise address of the corporate seat (to the
extent that it does not influence applicable law) etc. Conflicts can arise, how-
ever, over other sections of the articles of association. In addition to the fun-
damental changes discussed above, as well as entrenchment provisions to
thwart these changes,118 one example is the jurisdiction of incorporation, be-
cause it determines applicable law and thus also the degree of board autonomy.
113 Paul Davies & Klaus Hopt, Control Transactions, in The Anatomy of Corporate
Law 225, 228 (Reinier Kraakman et al. eds., 2nd ed. 2009).
114 Jensen, supra note 106, at 323.
115 RonaldW.Masulis et al.,Corporate Governance and Acquirer Returns, 62 J. Fin. 1851,
1852 (2007).
116 Yakov Amihud & Baruch Lev, Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for Conglom-
erate Mergers, 12 Bell J. Econ. 605 (1981).
117 Matthias M. Siems, Convergence in Shareholder Law 162 (2008).
118 Rock et al., supra note 108, at 190.
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Conflicts can also be found in provisions relating to shareholder voting and
dividend rights. Especially in concentrated ownership structures where direc-
tors are appointed and supported by one or more large shareholders, directors
could be tempted (or forced) to use any power they would have to allocate to
these shareholders preferential or increased dividend rights, multiple voting
rights or a special role in director nomination or appointment procedures.119
With regard to a company’s articles of association, the proposed framework
would, therefore, support differentiating between provisions that the board
can amend and those that belong to the exclusive competence of the share-
holder meeting.
IV. Counterarguments and refinements
It might be argued that the proposed normative criterion of inherent conflicts
of interest is not very different from a focus on the first agency problem and
that several important arguments in the shareholder democracy debate have
been neglected. This Part succinctly considers these remaining arguments and
investigates if they require that the proposed criterion be further refined. An
important finding will be that many objections fall flat in light of the inherent
nature of the conflicts of interest that, as argued above, should bolster share-
holder power.
1. Market discipline and legal agency strategies
One possible objection against reverting to shareholder power anytime direc-
tors face an inherent conflict of interest is that there is a myriad of other
mechanisms that mitigate the first agency conflict (other than the rules on
conflict of interest and related party transactions, which have been discussed
above). To a certain extent the first agency conflict is indeed kept in check by
the productmarket,120 themanagerial labormarket,121 the capital market122 and
the market for corporate control.123 In addition to these economic mech-
119 Rock et al., supra note 108, at 190–92.
120 Oliver D.Hart,TheMarketMechanism as an Incentive Scheme, 14Bell J. Econ. 366,
367 (1983); Jensen, supra note 106, at 323.
121 Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and Theory of the Firm, 88 J. Pol. Econ. 288, 292
(1980); Daniel R. Fischel, The ‘Race to the Bottom’ Revisited: Reflections on Recent
Developments in Delaware’s Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U. L. Rev. 913, 919 (1982).
122 Jensen, supra note 106, at 323.
123 Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Markets for Corporate Control, 73 J. Pol. Econ.
1965, (110) 112–113; Michael C. Jensen & Richard S. Ruback, The Market for Corpo-
rate Control: The Scientific Evidence, J. Fin. Econ. 5, 42–45 (1983).
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anisms, there are legal strategies, such as rules which prescribe or forbid spe-
cific behaviors (e.g. the corporate opportunities doctrine and rules prohibiting
competition with the company), liability standards, disclosure obligations,
exit possibilities for shareholders, variable remuneration, independent direc-
tors, etc.124 As a consequence, it is argued, directors and managers are well
aware of their duties125 and subject to forceful incentives to act in the corporate
interest.126 Shareholder power, which is, in fact, itself a legal agency strategy to
deal with agency conflicts (the “appointment rights strategy” and the “deci-
sion rights strategy”), should then be used only exceptionally because it is the
most drastic of these strategies; it boils down to undoing the agency relation-
ship for certain matters.
The above mechanisms do mitigate the first agency conflict but not suffi-
ciently. First, the discipline effect of the markets is limited.127 The disciplining
effect of the capital market is easy to circumvent. Many firms can satisfy their
financing needs with retained profits so that they only sporadically have to
appeal to the capital market.128 Even when they have to, poor performance
merely increases the costs of capital, meaning that securities are sold at a lower
price, the financial consequences of which are suffered in the first place by the
shareholders.129 Similarly, a weak competitive position in the product market
is mainly detrimental for the shareholders130 and the discipline coming from it
can significantly be hampered in case of an oligopoly or monopoly.131 Too
much reliance on the market for managers and directors is not warranted
either: even if poor performance negatively affects the stock price, in reality
it seldom leads to dismissal of directors and/or top management, at least in
jurisdictions with weak shareholder power, like the United States.132 In the
takeover market, directors often have a host of techniques available to protect
against hostile takeovers –especially in the United States – so that potential
124 Armour et al., supra note 67, at 39–45; Enriques et al, supra note 73, at 78–82.
125 Lipton & Savitt, supra note 49, at 749–54.
126 E.g. Bainbridge, supra note 49, at 1740, 1746–47; James McConvill, The False
Promise of Pay For Performance: Embracing a Positive Model of the Com-
pany Executive 42–51 (2005). See also Bratton & Wachter, supra note 56, at 675–88.
127 WilliamBratton,Agency Theory and IncentiveCompensation, inResearchHand-
book on Executive Pay 101 104 (Randall S. Thomas & Jennifer G. Hill eds., 2012);
Mark J. Roe, Corporate Law’s Limits, 31 J. Legal Stud. 233, 243–46 (2002).
128 Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of Shareholder Franchise, 93 Va. L. Rev. 675, 715
(2007); Lynn A. Stout, The Unimportance of Being Efficient, 87 Mich.L. Rev. 613,
645–47 (1988).
129 Bebchuk, supra note 128, at 715; Barker, supra note 85, at 147.
130 Bebchuk, supra note 128, at 715–16.
131 Bebchuk, supra note 100, at 1467; Eisenberg, supra note 100, at 1489.
132 Eisenberg, supra note 100, at 1495–97.
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acquirers cannot punish them for weak results.133 In continental Europe, hos-
tile takeovers are the exception due to typically concentrated stock ownership
structures.134 The discipline of the capital market and the market for corporate
control also depends on the efficiency of the capital market in absorbing and
reflecting information,135 while the efficient capital market hypothesis has
increasingly come under attack.136
Second, legal strategies are an insufficient remedy for the first agency problem
as well. Specific rules and disclosure obligations may be good at preventing
conflicts of interest in certain circumstances, or at reducing their impact, but it
is impossible for the legislator to foresee and enforce every situation. Variable
pay is often set in such a way that its connection with performance is tenuous
(possibly because it is itself the result of an agency conflict137), which can even
have perverse effects and induce excessive risk-taking.138 Even the effective-
ness of well-designed variable remuneration is affected by other factors be-
yond the control of the company, such as the beneficiary’s personal wealth.139
More fundamentally, there are certain types of agency costs that escape the
reach of even the finest legal strategies. Legal provisions can successfully
prevent directors and managers from “stealing”, understood broadly as any
transfer of value from shareholders to directors and managers, but can only
indirectly tackle “shirking”, i.e. poor decision-making that undermines share-
holder value (and in many cases the latter is even protected by the business
judgment rule).140 Finally, the said agency strategies are not alwaysmore trans-
action cost efficient than shareholder power. For example, when insurgents
need to launch a hostile takeover just to replace directors, because the power of
133 Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards:
Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 887, 912–14 (2002); Blanaid
J. Clarke, Where was the ‘Market for Corporate Control’ When We Needed it?, in
CorporateGovernance and theGlobal Financial Crisis 75, 76–90 (W. Sun et al
eds., 2011); Eisenberg, supra note 100, at 1497–99.
134 Davies & Hopt, supra note 11, at 270.
135 Clarke, supra note 133, at 76–90.
136 See Nicholas C. Barberis & Richard Thaler, A Survey of Behavioral Finance, in
Handbook of the Economics of Finance 1051, 1054–73 (2003);Andrei Shleifer,
Inefficient Markets: An Introduction To Behavioral Finance (2000); Lynn
A. Stout,TheMechanisms ofMarket Inefficiency: An Introduction to theNew Finance,
28 J. Corp. L. 635, 653–54 (2003).
137 Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 87.
138 William Sun et al., Introduction: Rethinking Corporate Governance – Lessons from
theGlobal Financial Crisis, inCorporateGovernance and theGlobal Financial Crisis 1,
7 (William Sun et al. eds., 2011).
139 John E. Core&Wayne R.Guay, Is CEOPay TooHigh andAre Incentives Too Low?A
Wealth-Based Contracting Framework, 24 Acad. Mgmt. Persp. 5 (2010).
140 Roe, supra note 127, at 235.
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the shareholder meeting to do the latter by simple resolution is impaired.
Incentive contracts based on results also come at a cost, as they shift part of
the business risk to the beneficiary and force the company to compensate for
this through higher pay.141 Another example is the presence of independent
directors on the board. While this strategy may alleviate the first agency
problem, it does not come without a price in terms of decision-making costs,
as independent directors do not possess the same company-specific knowl-
edge as inside board members.142
While the above may leave room for debate, one thing remains beyond doubt:
the shareholder meeting cannot be abolished. Many of the mechanisms men-
tioned in fact presuppose certain powers of the shareholder meeting in order
to function properly, such as the power to dismiss directors or to determine the
success or failure of a takeover bid. Shareholder power, market discipline and
legal strategies must be combined to counterbalance board authority. In the
words of Arrow, board authority needs to be weighed against board account-
ability.143 But within the accountability techniques, where do we draw the line
between the role of shareholder authority on the one hand and that of market
discipline and legal strategies on the other hand?
This is where the criterion of inherent conflicts of interest comes into play
again. When directors’ interests are inherently opposed to those of the share-
holders, market discipline and legal strategies (other than shareholder say) will
lack the power required to induce directors to act against and completely
disregard their own interests. Sanctions (either from markets or the law) will
only cause the directors to internalize the negative external effects of their
behavior and weigh them against their own interests.144 When the expected
personal gains outweigh the expected punishment, the sanction will fail to
obtain its intended effect. Directors should never consider their own interests
against the interests of the company. Otherwise, the harm in terms of share-
holder value may well exceed the gain from directors’ specialization and other
decision-making advantages.
141 KathleenM. Eisenhardt,Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review, 14Acad.Mgmt.
Rev. 57, 61 (1989).
142 See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Director in the United States, 1950–
2005: Of Shareholders Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 1465, 1506
(2007).
143 Kenneth J. Arrow, The Limits of Organization (1974).
144 See M. Kruithof,Wanneer vormen tegenstrijdige belangen een belangenconflict?, in
Van alle markten. Liber Amicorum Eddy Wymeersch 575, 584–90 (2008).
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2. Dysfunctional shareholders: shareholder passivity, short-termism,
private interests, institutional investors and proxy advisors
Arguments invoked against extensive shareholder power are often based on
shareholder passivity, short-termism, special interest shareholders and the
weight of non-residual owners like institutional investors and proxy advisors.
These are all variations on the same theme, namely that the shareholder meet-
ing does not function properly, or, at the very least, that its optimal incentives
are illusory.
Rationally apathetic shareholders throughout Europe do indeed stay away
from shareholder meetings in great numbers145 and in the past have not en-
gaged in intensivemonitoring, at least during the times when the economywas
strong.146 Some authors conclude that shareholder say should be limited, argu-
ing that companies should not incur the high transaction costs of shareholder
meetings when shareholders do not make use of their powers.147
A further consequence of shareholder absenteeism is that decisions are made
by a small fraction of the shareholders, which can amplify the influence of
large shareholders in a concentrated stock ownership structure (see Part III,
Section 3) and the influence of minority shareholders in a dispersed owner-
ship structure (or even board and management, but the latter can hardly be
problematic in the eyes of a board primacist). When minority shareholders
obtain decisive influence, the risk is real that the outcome of the vote in the
shareholder meeting is determined by short-termism or private interests of
minority shareholders. In particular, institutional investors like hedge funds
have been accused of pressuring for actions that are profitable in the short
run at the expense of long-term value. Shareholder myopia is regularly used
as an argument to justify board insulation from shareholder intervention.148
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2007–08, this criticism was
145 Luc Renneboog & Peter Szilagyi, Shareholder Engagement at European General
Meetings, in Boards and Shareholders in European Listed Companies 315, 320
(Massimo Belcredi & Guido Ferrarini eds., 2013).
146 Barker, supra note 85, at 144–45.
147 Bainbridge, supra note 49, at 1751; Strine, supra note 74, at 1765; Christoph Van der
Elst, Shareholder Activism in Belgium: The Belgian AGMs and EGMs in 2011, Tilburg
Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 002/2012, available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1929792.
148 E.g. Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53UCLA
L. Rev. 561, 579–83 (2006); Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom,
35 Bus. Law. 101, 104–05, 114–16 (1979); Martin Lipton & Paul K. Rowe, The Incon-
venient Truth About Corporate Governance: Some Thoughts on Vice-Chancellor
Strine’s Essay, 33 J. Corp. L. 63, 66–67 (2007); Lipton & Savitt, supra note 49, at
745–47; Strine, supra note 74, at 1764, 1766–67.
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supplemented with shareholders’ alleged tendency to support excessive risk-
taking (mainly in financial institutions). They would do so because they
would reap all possible gains from risky decisions, while their possible losses
are capped at the value of their investment due to shareholders’ limited
liability.149
Shareholders’ interests can diverge from those of the company in many other
ways. Shareholders with an additional role within the company (e.g. director,
employee) or employee pension funds may vote against an efficient takeover
only to protect current employment.150 Participants in the shareholder meet-
ing may have fully uncoupled the economic risk from their voting power
through share borrowing, short-selling or record date capture (empty voting)
ormay even have economic interests that are diametrically opposed to those of
the company (negative voting).151 Shares are often also held by public pension
funds, who may be subject to political pressure to defend local employment
when plant closure is considered;152 faith-based organizations, pension funds,
and socially responsible investor funds, who have an explicit social agenda;153
and sovereign wealth funds, which are sometimes suspected of favoring na-
tional interests.154 Because shareholders’ interests are so heterogeneous and
sometimes diverge from those of the company, board primacy champions
contend that the board of directors should have primary decision-making
authority to mediate the various interests of the shareholders, to protect share-
holders from each other, and to give priority to the company’s long-term
interest.155
149 European Commission, Green Paper – Corporate governance in financial institutions
and remuneration policies (COM(2010) 285 final), 4.
150 Anabtawi, supra note 148, at 586–90; Bainbridge, supra note 49, at 1754–55; Grant
M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, One Share, One Vote and the False Promise of
Shareholder Homogeneity, 30 Cardozo L. Rev. 445, 486–88 (2008).
151 Anabtawi, supra note 148, at 583–85; Carl Clottens, Empty Voting: A European Per-
spective, 9 ECFR 446, 447–51 (2012); Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, Empty Voting
and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership: Taxonomy, Implications, and Reforms, 61 Bus.
Law. 1011 (2006).
152 Anabtawi, supra note 148, at 588–89; Bainbridge, supra note 49, at 1754–55; Roberta
Romano, Less Is More: Making Institutional Investor Activism a Valuable Mechanism
of Corporate Governance, 18 Yale J. Reg. 174, 231–32 (2001).
153 Lynn A. Stout, Takeovers in the Ivory Tower: How Academics Are Learning Martin
Lipton May be Right, 60 Bus. Law. 1435, 1449 (2005).
154 Ronald J. Gilson & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Sovereign Wealth Funds and Corporate
Governance: A Minimalist Response to the New Mercantilism, 60 Stan. L. Rev.
1345 (2008); Hayden & Bodie, supra note 150, at 488–91.
155 E.g. Anabtawi, supra note 148, at 564, 583–92; Bainbridge, supra note 49, at 1754;
Martin Lipton, Twenty-Five Years After Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom:
Old Battles, New Attacks and the Continuing War, Bus. Law. 1369, 1377–78 (2005);
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Institutional investors and proxy advisors, once hailed as the saviors of share-
holder activism, also have different incentives than residual claimants, so that
their role is sometimes invoked against shareholder empowerment.156 Bank
trust departments, insurers and mutual funds regularly have other commercial
relationships with the companies they are supposed to monitor (e.g. credit
agreements, insurance coverage and management of private pension funds for
these companies).157 In addition, the money managers effectively making the
investment and monitoring decisions within the institutional investors may
personally have even different incentives.158 Proxy advisory firms (and vote
advisors) add another agency layer – they exercise noticeable influence over
the votes in shareholder meetings, but their interests may diverge from those
of the investors they advise.159 Again, these conflicts of interest are exacerbated
when proxy advisors have other ties with the companies they monitor (e.g.
when the latter is a client of the proxy advisor for corporate governance
advice).
Advocates of strong shareholder power maintain that the fact that sharehold-
ers do not always make use of their decision-making power is not a reason to
not at least allow them to make the decision. In the worst case, they argue,
fewer value enhancing decisions will be made than desirable, which is still
better than having none of these decisions at all.160 In response to the claims
regarding private and short-term interests, they object that proposals from
special interest shareholders and short-term oriented shareholders would not
be able to garner a majority vote.161 One can indeed expect most of the prob-
lems of myopia and private interest to solve themselves in this way. This will
not be the case, however, when a company is confronted with both absentee-
ism and private interests, because absenteeism can impart decisive influence on
Lipton & Savitt, supra note 49, at 756–57; Lynn A. Stout, The Mythical Benefits of
Shareholder Control, 93 Va. L. Rev. 789, 794 (2007).
156 Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder
Activism, 79 Geo. L.J. 445, 466–68 (1991); Strine, supra note 74, at 1764–65.
157 Bainbridge, supra note 49, at 1754; Rock, supra note 156, at 569–72.
158 Robert C. Clark, Four Stages of Capitalism: Reflections on Investment Management
Treatises (Book Review), 94 Harv. L. Rev. 561, 564–66 (1981).
159 Tamara C. Belinfanti, The Proxy Advisory and Corporate Governance Industry: The
Case for Increased Oversight and Control, Stan. J. L. Bus. & Fin. 384, 387 (2009).
160 See, regarding institutional investors: Bebchuk, supra note 50, at 1799.
161 Bebchuk, supra note 59, at 883–84; Bebchuk, supra note 50, at 1799–1801; Bebchuk,
supra note 128, at 721;GeorgeW.Dent, Jr.,The EssentialUnity of Shareholders and the
Myth of Investor Short-Termism, 35 Del. J. Corp. L. 97, 106–09 (2010); Ronald
J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist
Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 863, 897
(2013); Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate Governance:
Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions, 96Mich.L. Rev. 1018, 1082–84 (1998).
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minority shareholders pursuing their private interests (majority requirements
mostly being counted on the basis of votes present or represented). The prob-
lems of passivity, short-term thinking and private interests are real and cer-
tainly need to be dealt with. Although the means to do so go far beyond the
scope of this article, the point I want to make here is that the solution is not to
reduce shareholder power.
In a sound system of distribution of powers, a shift of powers from the share-
holder meeting to the board of directors would not be the appropriate solution
for private interests. Indeed, in the proposed framework the authority of the
shareholdermeeting is already limited tomatterswhere directors face an inher-
ent conflict of interest. Depriving the shareholder meeting of these powers
because of a risk that some shareholders pursue private interests and shifting
them to an inherently conflicted board of directorswould only be throwingout
the babywith the bathwater –while getting rid of a few exceptional short-term
orprivate interest inspireddecisionsof the shareholdermeeting, onewould also
lose out, on a more permanent basis, on the benefit of having these specific
decisions made by a corporate body that is at least not systematically con-
flicted.162Anexample illustrates this point. Shareholders are frequently accused
of short-term thinking when they have to choose between distributing a divi-
dendand takingover another company. Shareholders, so it is said,will prefer the
immediate gain of a dividend even if the takeoverwould createmore value. Yet,
we have seen above (Part II, Section 5) that both the dividend decision and the
takeover are matters in which directors have an inherent conflict of interest. In
contrastwith the conflicts thatmay affect some shareholders, the conflict of the
directors is systematic and affects all of them. Shifting the decision-making
authority to thedirectorswould thus createdirect agency costsmore frequently
thanshort-termismintheshareholdermeetingwould.Becausethepowersofthe
shareholder meeting under the proposed framework include, among others,
matters of discipline and accountability, such a shift would moreover produce
pernicious indirect effects even on the exercise of powers that belonged in any
case to the board of directors.163
Even without regard to the subject of the decision, one can easily see how
directors are often guilty of the same failures for which shareholders face
criticism. Directors, for instance, can just as well be considered empty voters.
In the hypothesis where empty voting most commonly occurs, namely open
companies with atomized share ownership, directors do not always own sig-
nificant equity in the company (and, if they do, could secretly hedge their
162 See, with regard to amendments of articles of association generally, Bebchuk, supra
note 50, at 1803–04.
163 See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth That Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value,
113 Colum. L. Rev. 1637, 1679–81 (2013).
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participation). Similarly, short-termism also afflicts management and directors
– their concern to preserve their position ought not to be conflated with a care
for the long-term interest of the company and is often rather a source of
conflicting interests. Directors may have a short-term horizon resulting from
their wish to boast visible results during their tenure164 and from the fact that
their claims on the corporation are limited to their tenure with the firm.165 In
addition, the market for corporate control, financial reporting obligations and
variable remuneration may push them to keep share prices high in the short
term, even if that will have a negative effect on long-term perspectives.166
Shareholder short-termism can, therefore, not support more autonomy of
board and management.167 The same can be said with regard to shareholders’
alleged risk seeking behavior. While shareholders enjoy limited liability, those
who are able to tilt a vote in the general meeting do have a considerable
investment at stake. For directors that is not generally the case. Admittedly,
they have their job at stake but, as discussed above, this does not mean that
their interests aligned with corporation. Moreover, their liability is tested only
marginally and dismissal often takes place only in the most egregious cases. In
the aftermath of the financial crisis, shareholders were accused of not mon-
itoring directors risky behavior well enough. This can hardly be a reason for
increasing the authority of those who took the risks.
3. Tunneling by controlling shareholders
The next question is if and how the second agency conflict affects the proposed
framework. The second agency conflict refers to the tension between control-
ling shareholders and minority shareholders and, thus, plagues companies
with concentrated stock ownership.168 Controlling shareholders risk appro-
priating private benefits of control, that they do not share with the minority,
thus capturing 100% of the upside and bearing the related costs only in pro-
164 Mark J. Roe, Corporate Short-Termism – In the Boardroom and in the Courtroom, 68
Bus. Law. (2013) 977, 996–98.
165 Michael C. Jensen, ATheory of the Firm: Governance, Residual Claims, and
Organizational Forms 145 (2000).
166 Lucian A. Bebchuk & Lars A. Stole, Do Short-Term Objectives Lead to Under- or
Overinvestment in Long-Term Projects?, 48 J. Fin. 719–29 (1993); M.P. Narayanan,
Managerial Incentives for Short-Term Results, 40 J. Fin. 1469–84 (1985); John
R. Graham et al., The Economic Implications of Corporate Financial Reporting, 40
J. Acct. & Econ. 3–73 (2005); Jeremy C. Stein, Takeover Threats and Managerial
Myopia, 96 J. Pol. Econ. 61 (1988); Jeremy C. Stein, Efficient Capital Markets, In-
efficient Firms: A Model of Myopic Corporate Behavior, Q. J. Econ. 655 (1989).
167 Roe, supra note 164, at 1003.
168 Armour et al., supra note 67, at 36
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portion to its stockholding, externalizing the rest of the costs on the minor-
ity169. The second agency problem grows exponentially when the majority
shareholder boosts his influence by means of so-called control enhancing
mechanisms (or controlling minority structures), such as shares with multiple
voting rights, pyramid structures and cross-holdings of shares.170 An intuitive
reflex to the controlling shareholder’s preponderance in the shareholder meet-
ing could be to transfer authority to the board of directors.
As a rule, increasing board power in response to the second agency problem
will not be of much avail because the board of directors is usually dominated
by directors appointed by the controlling shareholder. One could attempt to
solve this by also curbing the shareholders’ meeting appointment and dismiss-
al rights. That would increase directors’ clout on their own appointment and
removal, which can hardly be in the interest of the company, given directors’
inherent conflict of interest on this point. In addition, it would reduce the
accountability of the board and, thus, merely replace the second agency con-
flict with the first. In dual board structures the reasoning is slightly different.
Directors of supervisory boards do not face an inherent conflict of interest
with regard to the election and removal of executive board members. One
could, therefore, contemplate reducing shareholders’ voice on the election of
executive board members in favor of the supervisory board, something that is
indeed common in two-tier boards.171 The small increase in first agency costs
(shareholder control is indeed not limited, but becomes more indirect) may
still be a reasonable price to pay for the reduction of the second agency con-
flict. However, for substantive powers, executive board members usually have
the same inherent conflicts of interest as members of a monistic board – they
are still directors, after all, and thus subject to conflicts inherent in a director-
ship. Theoretically, if the shareholder meeting would have no influence over
the position of executive directors (which is virtually never the case172), one
could make a case for increasing the authority of the executive board on
matters where the conflict relates to their position, such as takeover defenses,
mergers etc. However, personal side benefits in negotiations might remain an
important source of conflict. This is not an argument against dual board
structures an sich, but it does lead to the conclusion that dual board structures
169 See Alexander Dyck & Luigi Zingales, Private Benefits of Control: An International
Comparison, 59 J. Fin. 537 (2004); Simon Johnson et al.,Tunneling, 90Am. Econ. Rev.
22 (2000), reprinted in Capital Markets and Company Law (Klaus Hopt & Eddy
Wymeersch eds., 2003).
170 Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and Dual Class Equity,
in Concentrated Corporate Ownership 295, 301–06 (Randall K. Morck ed.,
2000).
171 Cools, supra note 3, at 209–17. See however the text accompanying next footnote.
172 Cools, supra note 3, at 209–17.
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are not a convincing reason to deprive shareholder meeting of substantive
powers that it would have in the proposed framework.
Varying the legal distribution of powers with stock ownership patterns (irre-
spective of board structure) would also create practical difficulties. A statutory
rule that distinguishes along these lines, if it could at all be formulated ad-
equately, would continuously impose complex calculations on the company as
we know them in the context of mandatory takeover bids.173 Even more in-
tricate issues arise when one considers the indirect effects such an ownership
dependent power shift could possibly produce. Elsewhere I have explained
how expansive shareholder power likely contributes to concentrated stock
ownership and how strong board autonomy may be a reason for controllers
to sell off their stock and let it disperse.174 If stock ownership structures
respond to the legal distribution of powers, then the law should not adapt
the distribution of powers to ownership structures in the other direction, as
this risks creating instability. Specifically, if the law responded to ownership
concentration by scaling down shareholder power, ownership would disperse
again, which would then cause the shareholder-friendly regime to apply again,
causing ownership to concentrate again, thus creating an endless cycle of
concentration and dispersal, with changing legal regimes.
Again, the conclusion is that the second agency conflict does not call for
tweaks in the legal distribution of powers between the board and the share-
holder meeting. Strategies specifically designed to protect minority sharehold-
ers, such as techniques for proportional representation on the board, special
procedures for conflict of interest situations (including related party trans-
actions), limitations on control enhancing mechanisms, liability and avoidance
rules on abuse of majority and carefully designed enhanced majority require-
ments, seem more apt to come to grips with the second agency conflict.175
173 The difference is obviously that in the context of themandatory bid, the calculation has
to bemade only by important shareholders at times their equity stake changes, while in
the context of distribution of powers a public company would have to make the
calculation almost every time a decision is made.
174 Sofie Cools, The Real Difference in Corporate Law Between the United States and
Continental Europe: Distribution of Powers, 30 Del. J. Corp. L. 697, 755–62 (2005);
Sofie Cools, La répartition juridique des pouvoirs au sein des sociétés d’Europe con-
tinentale et des sociétés américaines, 106 Rev. Prat. Soc. 149, 179–92 (2007).
175 See Enriques et al., supra note 73, at 89–99; Pierre-Henri Conac et al., Constraining
Dominant Shareholders’ Self-Dealing: The Legal Framework in France, Germany, and
Italy, 4 ECFR 491 (2007).
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4. Stakeholder interests
So far this article proceeded on the assumption that corporate interests equal
long-term shareholder value. While many authors, especially in the United
States, have proclaimed shareholder wealth maximization the norm for cor-
porate governance,176 this is far from uncontested. Others believe that a com-
pany should maximize the interests of all constituents impacted by the com-
pany’s actions, including not only shareholders but also employees, suppliers,
creditors, and even the broader community.177 Adherents of the shareholder
value norm often try to find middle ground in the position that corporate law
should indeed strive to maximize value for all constituents, but that this goal is
best attained through shareholder wealth maximization, as this would increase
the total pie which can be divided among all constituents.178 The goal here is
not to take sides in this debate,179 but to investigate the implications of possible
stakeholder concerns for the distribution of powers between the shareholder
meeting and the board of directors in the proposed framework.
Stakeholder concerns are only seldom addressed by granting stakeholders a
direct say in corporate decision-making, other than the appointment of direc-
tors (and thus indirect participation).180 The textbook example of this ap-
176 J. Armour et al.,What is Corporate Law?, in The Anatomy of Corporate Law 1,
28–29 (R. Kraakman et al. eds., 2nd ed. 2009); Bainbridge, supra note 48, at 573;
Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm:
A Reply to Professor Green, 50 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1423, 1423–25 (1993); Stephen
M. Bainbridge, Director v. Shareholder Primacy in the Convergence Debate, 16
Transnat’l Law. 45, 47 (2002); Robert C. Clark, Corporate Law 678 (1986); Jill
E. Fisch,Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder Primacy, 31
J. Corp. L. 637, 646 (2006); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of
History in Corporate Law, 89 Geo. L.J. 439 (2001); Michael C. Jensen, Value Max-
imization, Stakeholder Theory and the Corporate Objective Function, 14 J. Appl.
Corp. Fin. 8 (2001).
177 E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45Harv. L. Rev.
1145, 1147–48 (1932); Keay, supra note 78, at 374; Beate Sjafjell, The Golden Mean
or a Dead End? The Takeover Directive in a Shareholder versus Stakeholder Perspec-
tive, in European Company Law in Accelerated Progress 107, 109–10 (Steef
M. Bartman ed., 2006); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Specific Investment and
Corporate Law, Eur. Bus. Org. L. Rev. 473 (2006).
178 Armour et al., supra note 176, at 28–29; Jean-Pierre Bertrel, Liberté contractuelle et
sociétés, Rev. trim. Dr. Comm. 595, 625–26, 628 (1996); Hansmann & Kraakman,
supra note 175, at 441–42; Virginia E. Harper Ho, ’Enlightened Shareholder Value’:
Corporate Governance Beyond the Shareholder-Stakeholder Divide, 36 J. Corp. L. 59
(2010); Keay, supra note 78, at 376.
179 This relates to the third agency conflict, which concerns the relationship between the
company and its contractual counterparties (Armour et al., supra note 67, at 36).
180 Eisenberg, supra note 58, at 17–21; Enriques et al, supra note 73, at 101.
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proach is the GermanMittbestimmung, where employee representatives sit on
the supervisory board. In case of participation of stakeholders in decision-
making, it is unnecessary to decide whether the board or the shareholder
meeting is in a best position to defend stakeholder interests. The only reason
to adapt the distribution of powers would then be to limit or to expand scope
of stakeholder say, in which case a new delicate balance must be struck be-
tween agency and transaction costs, taking into account not only the reasoning
made above but also the benefits of more or less stakeholder say.
Another way to promote stakeholder value is by obliging (or at least allowing)
the company organs to take into account or to further stakeholder interests.181
This is where the distribution of powers debate flares up. Board primacists
often assert that the board and management are in a better position than the
shareholder meeting to take into account stakeholder interests – an argument
that has been raised particularly in the debate on takeover defenses.182 The
protection of stakeholder interests would in their opinion legitimize more
managerial and board discretion. As mentioned in Part I, Section 2, some183
board primacists go a step further and view the board as a mediator, balancing
the various interests of shareholders and corporate constituents.184 Corporate
power should for that reason remain in the hands of managers. Too much
shareholder power could allow shareholders to opportunistically “hold up”
other team members, i.e. make unreasonable requests (e.g. for the payment
of a generous dividend while cutting down on employee benefits) knowing
that stakeholders who have made firm-specific investments cannot leave
easily.185
The first reason for the board’s alleged suitability to protect stakeholder in-
terests is that the board would have similar interests as a consequence of their
natural tendency to preserve their own employment. In a takeover, for exam-
ple, this would make directors more inclined to pay heed to local employ-
ment.186 A serious problem with this argument is that the overlap of interests
of directors and stakeholders is completely random. Directors’ interests might
just as well diametrically oppose those of stakeholders: they may refuse to sell
the company to a buyer that would improve the employees’ prospects while
displacing current management or they may agree with a merger that will be
followed by layoffs because the directors were seduced with handsome
181 Enriques et al, supra note 73, at 103.
182 E.g. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Uncertain Case for Takeover Reform: An Essay on Stock-
holders, Stakeholders and Bust-Ups, 1988Wis. L. Rev. 435, 449.
183 Not all board primacists agree with the conception of the board as a mediator. See e.g.
Bainbridge, supra note 48, at 593–605.
184 Blair & Stout, supra note 54, at 253–54, 286, 304–05.
185 Stout, supra note 155, at 795–96.
186 Stout, supra note 155, at 797.
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perks.187 In fact, the same finding of random alignment of interests was made
above with regard to some shareholders and there the private interests were
invoked by board primacists as argument against shareholder power (Part III,
Section 2). The stakeholder argument could, therefore, be turned around and
be used to supportmore shareholder say, on the basis that at least some share-
holders will use their increased power to advance stakeholders’ concerns.188
Because of the randomness of this alignment,189 I do not subscribe to such an
argument either.
A second reason why directors would be better advocates of stakeholder
interests is that in most jurisdictions they have a legal duty of loyalty.190 In
the context of stakeholder protection, this duty might not, however, be of
much comfort, as it is extremely difficult for courts to review compliance.191
Different constituents often have conflicting interests and even interests of the
same category of stakeholders may diverge depending on the time horizon
over which they are considered.192 The selection of “valuable” stakeholder
interests that enhance the overall welfare (or however one would name the
goal) and the exclusion of those that have just been referred to as private
interests is a thorny matter. As a consequence, one could “justify almost any
action on the grounds that it benefits some group”.193 Allowing or mandating
directors to take into account stakeholder interests would in the first place
broaden their margin of discretion and would be prone to abuse.194 Because of
their own inherent interests, directors cannot be considered a neutral media-
tor.
Because there is nothing that ties directors’ interests to those of the stake-
holders on a systematic basis, stakeholder interests cannot justify a shift of
powers between directors and shareholders in whatever direction.195 There is
187 Bebchuk, supra note 59, at 911.
188 See e.g. Lisa M. Fairfax,Making the Corporation Safe for Shareholder Democracy, 69
Ohio St. L.J. 53, 83–85 (2008); LisaM. Fairfax, Shareholder Democracy on Trial, 3Va.
L. & Bus. Rev. 1, 31–32 (2008).
189 See the difficulties raised in Part II, Section 2 and Fairfax, supra note 188, at 94–96
(some groups of stakeholders, mainly creditors, do not benefit from shareholder de-
mocracy).
190 Stout, supra note 155, at 797.
191 Bebchuk, supra note 59, at 910.
192 See Hansmann, supra note 76, at 44.
193 Oliver Hart, An Economist’s View of Fiduciary Duty, 43 U. Toronto L.J. 299, 303
(1993).
194 Bebchuk, supra note 75, at 1021–1027; Enriques et al, supra note 73, at 103.
195 A different kind of relationship might exist in that large shareholder influence could
call for more stakeholder protection (see Martin Gelter, The Dark Side of Shareholder
Influence: Managerial Autonomy and Stakeholder Orientation in Comparative Cor-
porate Governance, 50 Harv. Int’l L. J. 129 (2009)).
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one big exception. The proposed framework is valid only for enterprises in
going concern. When continuity is endangered, the incentives of shareholders
as residual owners disappear. Once their investment is lost, shareholders have
an interest in taking excessive risk – further losses are, in any case, externalized
to creditors who otherwise might still recoup some money, while any unex-
pected profits would still be reaped by the shareholders. In this situation, the
residual claimants are no longer the shareholders but the creditors and the
latter become better fit to make decisions for the company.196
V. Conclusion
Shareholder franchise has been at the forefront of corporate governance re-
form and debates for a few decades now. Still, how the scope of their franchise
should be demarcated remained unclear. This article searched for an efficient
and consistent criterion and, after weighing all arguments pro and contra
shareholder power, found it in directors’ inherent conflicts of interest. Share-
holder say should comprise, but also be limited to, those matters in which
directors face conflicting interests purely because of their position of director
(in some cases only when the decision is material for the company). Assigning
shareholders more powers causes unnecessary costs of organizing shareholder
meetings and threatens to lead to poor decision-making and avoidable influ-
ence of special interest shareholders. Giving shareholders fewer powers may
engender unacceptably high agency costs within the board of directors.
In the present day, conflicts of interest make headlines worldwide in all areas
of law. The global financial crisis has sparked outrage about conflicts of inter-
est in financial institutions providing multiple services, in rating agencies, in
experts publishing investment recommendations etc. Corporate lawmakers
should, in this context, not lose sight of an inherent conflict of interest within
corporations that was already an explicit concern over two hundred years ago.
196 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 77, at 404–05.
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